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1. In the last few years, much interest has been expressed in establishing an international code 
of conduct for those engaged in the life sciences as part of efforts to minimize present and 
future threats from biological weapons and bioterrorism.  While not a new idea, today there is 
a greater amount of attention being given to considering what form such a code might take 
and to drawing a code or codes up.  Yet despite the apparent wide ranging enthusiasm, so far 
the functions of such a code have been ill defined and little detailed elaboration has been 
offered in terms of its content or how such a code might be promulgated and implemented. 
 
2. Particular attention is being focused on such a code at present because the States Parties to 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention agreed1 at the resumed Fifth Review 
Conference in November 2002 that the topic to be considered in the new process at which the 
States Parties would ‘discuss, and promote common understanding and effective action’  
would in 2005 be: 
 
• The content, promulgation, and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists. 
 
3. This Briefing Paper examines the potential contribution of professional codes such as 
codes of ethics, codes of conduct and codes of practice.  The purpose of this Briefing Paper is 
four-fold: first, it traces the origins of codes in general before addressing alternative concepts 
of biological weapon-related codes being considered in contemporary policy discussions.  
Second, varied issues are identified for consideration by drawing on lessons from previous 
attempts to establish professional codes in the sciences and elsewhere.  Third, a widely 
applicable ‘matrix of codes’ comprising aspirational, educational and enforceable codes that 
might be adopted is outlined. As part of this, a detailed proposal is provided for a possible 
educational ‘code of conduct’ to minimize present and future threats from the misuse of the 
life sciences in regard to biological weapons.  Fourth, overall this Briefing Paper sharpens 
critical attention to the place and purpose of codes in responding to security threats.   
 
4. Although the adoption of codes has a certain common sense appeal, ensuring that a code 
makes a significant and effective contribution in combating security threats requires careful 
deliberation and concerted action.  The utility of codes should not be presumed.  With each 
stage in the formulation and implementation of codes, key issues need to be addressed about 
their aims and audience.  These are issues which require consideration of the interactions 
between arms control, science, ethics, and politics.  
 
                                                 
* Brian Rappert, Department of Sociology, University of Exeter, Exeter EX4 4QJ, United Kingdom. Telephone 
number +44-1392-263353.  E-mail: B.Rappert@ex.ac.uk  This work was funded by the UK Economic and 
Social Research Council (ESRC) New Security Challenges Programme (RES-223-25-0053).  The author would 
like to thank Malcolm Dando and Graham Pearson for comments on earlier drafts. This Briefing Paper is 
developed from a shorter paper to be published in Biosecurity & Bioterrorism.  
1United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org  
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5.  It needs to be recognized from the outset that as biological weapons are totally prohibited 
by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention, there is no sense in considering codes for 
biological weapons.  The consideration has to be focused on codes for those engaged in work 
in the life sciences which might be misused for biological weapons. 
 
The Origins of Codes 
 
6. Codes of conduct have long figured as part of the activities of professional organizations; 
indeed in the 19th century the establishment of codes was central to the establishment of 
medicine, law, and engineering as professions that could be entrusted to largely manage their 
own affairs.2 3  Formal codes specifying standards of acceptable behavior for professionals to 
their clients, employers and the public were predated by earlier examples such as the 
Hippocratic Oath.  In the 20th century, professional codes were further adopted and 
elaborated, often in response to high profile controversies.4 In medicine, for instance, the 
human experimentation atrocities committed in World War II led to the agreement of the ten 
ethical principles of the Nuremberg Code.5 This was later complemented by initiatives such 
as those of the World Medical Association’s 1948 Declaration of Geneva Physician's Oath6 
and 1964 Helsinki Declaration7 and the establishment of institutional review boards for 
biomedical research in many countries. 
 
7. In the physical and biological sciences, the emphasis placed historically on adopting codes 
of conduct has been much less acute than in engineering or medicine, not least because the 
conflicts of interest that motivated many professional codes for the latter areas were less 
evident and also as some sought to characterize science as a value neutral activity.  The lack 
of a formal code for scientists as a group and the level of awareness of ethical considerations 
has been a recurring topic of discussion since World War II8 9 10 and continues to this day.11 
12
 
8. The appropriateness of the involvement of scientists in military R&D has been a topic 
generating significant attention in Western scientific circles, which has led to some calls for 
explicit guidelines.  Concerns about biological weapons have played a significant part in 
science-military-society discussions.  Amid the disarmament movement and the Vietnam 
War in the 1960s and early 1970s, biological weapons were the subject of resolutions and 
debates in professional organizations such as the American Society for Microbiology 
(ASM)13 and the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.14  With the signing of the 
                                                 
2 Macdonald S. The Sociology of the Professions London: Sage; 1995. 
3 Fishbein M. A History of the American Medical Association 1847 to 1947 Philadelphia, Pa: WB Saunders; 
1947. 
4 Leake D. ed. Percival’s Medical Ethics Baltimore: William and Wilkins; 1927. 
5 See, for example, http://ohsr.od.nih.gov/guidelines/nuremberg.html 
6 World Medical Association. Declaration of Geneva September 1948. Available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/c8.htm 
7 World Medical Association. Declaration of Helsinki First adopted June 1964. Available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b3.htm 
8 Pigman W Carmichael E. An ethical code for scientists. Science 1950 111: 643-647 
9 Hedén C. Perspective on an identity card or certificate for scientists. Scientific World 1968 12: 24-28.  
10 Cournand The code of the scientists. Science 1977 198: 699-705. 
11 Simon J and Hersh M. 2002. An educational imperative. Minerva 40 2002: 37-55. 
12 Ten Have, H. Biology and codes of conduct. Proceeding of UNESCO COMEST Third Session Rio de Janeiro 
1-4 December 2003: 95-105. Available at http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/ 0013/001343/134391e.pdf 
 
13 Cassell G, Miller L, Rest R. Biological warfare: role of scientific societies. In: Zilinskas R. ed. The 
Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research New York: New York Academy of Science; 1994. 
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Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) in 1972 and its entry into force in 1975, 
debate shifted from the rights and wrongs of biological warfare overall which was totally 
prohibited by the BTWC to the appropriateness of activities undertaken as part of 
‘biodefence’ programmes.    
 
9. Subsequently various attempts have been made to address these expressed concerns by 
means of formalized codes. For instance, at least partially with an eye to biological weapons, 
in 1985 the ASM published15 its ‘Code of Ethics’ which obliged microbiologists to 
‘discourage any use of microbiology contrary to the welfare of humankind’ although the 
meaning of this phrase was left open for interpretation.  In 1989 the US Council for 
Responsible Genetics (CRG) launched a pledge for scientists not to participate knowingly ‘in 
research and teaching that will further the development of chemical and biological agents’.16  
In the 1990s Student Pugwash developed a pledge for young scientists analogous to the 
Hippocratic Oath to promote ethical reflection which included the promise that individuals 
‘will consider the ethical implications’ of their work.17 18  Combining various oaths, codes, 
and declarations the International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global 
Responsibility launched an appeal19 to engineers and scientists which included the 
commitment that ‘I pledge not to take part in the development and production of weapons of 
mass destruction and of weapons that are banned by international conventions.’ and also that 
‘Since the results of science ultimately belong to humankind, I will conscientiously consider 
my participation in secret research projects that serve military or economic interests. I will 
not participate in secret research projects if I conclude that society will be injured thereby. 
Should I decide to participate in any secret research, I will continuously reflect upon its 
implications for society and the environment.’ In 1999, the British Medical Association 
recommended20 that ‘Professional scientists and physicians have an ethical responsibility to 
reinforce the central norm that biological and genetic weapons are unacceptable.  This 
should be explicitly stated in codes of professional conduct in order to safeguard the public 
interest in matters of health and safety’. In a similar fashion, during the 1990s individuals 
such as Matthew Meselson made repeated calls for the adoption of codes of conduct.21, 22     
 
10.  The attention given to codes increased in 2001 after the failure to reach agreement on a 
legally binding instrument to strengthen the effectiveness and improve the implementation of 
the BTWC as well as following 9-11 and the US anthrax attacks.  These two sets of events 
have resulted in various initiatives to establish codes of conduct for those engaged in the life 
sciences.  At the government level attention to codes was given by the US and the UK as well 
as by the United Nations. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
14 Geissler E Haynes R. Prevention of a Biological and Toxin Arms Race and the Responsibility of Scientists 
Berlin: Akademie-Verlag; 1991. 
15 Cited in Cassell G, Miller L, Rest R. Biological Warfare: Role of Scientific Societies In The Microbiologist 
and Biological Defense Research Zilinskas, R (ed) New York: New York Academy of Science; 1994. 
16 Wright S. ed. Preventing a Biological Arms Race Cambridge, MA: MIT Press; 1990: 412. 
17 Student Pugwash USA, SPUSA Pledge, n.d.  Available at http://www.spusa.org/pledge/ 
18 Rotblat J. Science and Humanity in the Twenty-First Century www.nobel.se/medicine/articles/rotblat/ 
19 International Network of Engineers and Scientists for Global Responsibility, INES Appeal to Engineers and 
Scientists, 16 July 1995. Available at http://www.inesglobal.org/ines3.htm 
20 British Medical Association Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity London: Harwood Academic Publishers; 
1999: 101. 
21 Meselson M. The problem of biological weapons. Presented at AAAS Annual Meeting 17-22 February 2000 
Washington, DC.  
22 Meselson M. Averting the Hostile Exploitation of Biology, CBW Conventions Bulletin, 48, 16-19, 2000.  
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11.  In November 2001, following the US rejection of the legally binding instrument to 
strengthen the BTWC, President Bush made a number of proposals23 emphasizing primarily 
national rather than international measures to strengthen the BTWC, including that State 
Parties consider how to ‘Devise a solid framework for bioscientists in the form of a code of 
ethical conduct that would have universal recognition.’ In April 2002, the UK Foreign Office 
issued24 a Green Paper about the BTWC which included among possible measures to 
strengthen the BTWC a call for a code in suggesting that it:  
 
would be developed by academic and professional bodies to lay out standards 
internationally for work relevant to the prohibition of the Convention.  Such codes 
could include, inter alia, a statement that scientists will use their knowledge and skill 
for the advancement of human, animal, and plant welfare and will not conduct 
activities directed towards the use of micro-organisms or toxins or other biological 
agents for hostile purpose or in armed conflict. 
 
Such a code or codes could help to realize the commitment long made by the BTWC States 
Parties at the Review Conferences such as that made in the Final Declaration25 of the Fourth 
Review Conference that: 
 
3.  The Conference notes the importance of…Inclusion in textbooks and in medical, 
scientific and military education programmes of information dealing with the 
prohibitions and provisions contained in the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention and the Geneva Protocol of 1925. 
 
Consequently, information about the prohibitions of the BTWC should be included in 
textbooks and in educational programmes. 
 
12.  In September 2002, the report26 of the UN Policy Working Group on the United Nations 




Relevant United Nations offices should be tasked with producing proposals to 
reinforce ethical norms, and the creation of codes of conduct for scientists, through 
international and national scientific societies and institutions that teach sciences or 
engineering skills related to weapons technologies should be encouraged.  Such codes 
of conduct would aim to prevent the involvement of defence scientists or technical 
experts in terrorist activities and restrict public access to knowledge and expertise on 
the development, production, stockpiling and use of weapons of mass destruction or 
related technologies. 
 
                                                 
23 Bush G. President's Statement on Biological Weapons 1 November 2001, see 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2001/11/20011101.html  
24 Foreign and Commonwealth Office, Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention: 
Countering the Threat from Biological Weapons, London, April 2002. Available at http://www.fco.gov.uk/ 
Files/kfile/btwc290402,0.pdf  
25  United Nations, Fourth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Final Declaration, Geneva, 1996.  Available at http://www.opbw.org. 
26 United Nations. Annex Report of the Policy Working Group on the United Nations and Terrorism A/57/273-
S/2002/875, 6 August 2002.Available at http://www.un.dk/doc/A.57.0273_S.2002.875.pdf 
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This recommendation was subsequently endorsed by the UN General Assembly and the 
Security Council and transmitted to the Organizations and Specialized Agencies in the United 
Nations System. 
 
13.  Another United Nations body, UNESCO, had at its General Conference in October-
November 1997 approved the creation of the World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific 
Knowledge and Technology (COMEST)27. The establishment of this body reflected the 
increasing importance of ethical reflection in the light of the cultural and social effects of the 
rapid development of scientific knowledge and technology. As a unique forum of reflection, 
the task of COMEST is to formulate on a scientific basis ethical principles that can shed light 
on the various choices and impacts occasioned by new discoveries, and the values at stake. It 
seeks to motivate scientists by adding an ethical dimension to their intellectual freedom.   The 
first meeting of COMEST was in Oslo, Norway on 28 – 30 April 1999, the second in Berlin, 
Germany on 17 – 19 December 2001 and the third in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil on 1 – 4 
December 2003.  At the first COMEST meeting in a round table on the protection of the 
rights and freedoms of scientists, Sir Michael Atiyah mentioned28 the importance of 
whistleblowers ‘in the context of biology and weapon production’ noting that ‘although 
several international agreements had been drawn up with the object of preventing, limiting or 
banning the production of biological weapons, such weapons were unfortunately easy to 
hide. … Scientists must therefore have the right to denounce practises by their colleagues 
without having to fear reprisals.’    
 
14.  At the third COMEST meeting29 in December 2003, a session was held on a code of 
conduct for scientists.  In this, Mr Henk ten Have, Executive Secretary of COMEST, made a 
presentation entitled Towards a universal ethical oath for scientists.  In this he outlined the 
history of recent moves towards ethical principles for scientists which included the 
UNESCO/ICSU (International Council for Science) which met in Budapest in 1999 and 
produced the ‘Science Agenda – A Framework for Action.’30  This included the following: 
 
The ethics and responsibility of science should be an integral part of the education 
and training of all scientists.  It is important to instill in students a positive attitude 
towards reflection, alertness and awareness of ethical dilemmas they may encounter 
in their professional life.  Young scientists should be appropriately encouraged to 
respect and adhere to the basic ethical principles and responsibilities of science.  
UNESCO’s World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology 
(COMEST), in cooperation with ICSU’s Standing Committee on Responsibility and 
Ethics of Sciences (SCRES) have a special responsibility to follow up on this issue. 
 
This paragraph was fully endorsed by the 30th General Council of UNESCO in 1999 which 
also decided that ‘promoting debate, research on ethical issues related to the practice of 
science and to the application of science and technology … will be pursued in close 
                                                 
27 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, What is the COMEST?  Available at 
http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php_URL_ID=1856&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
28 Sir Michael Atiyah, Round Table on the Protection of the Rights and Freedoms of Scientists, Proceedings, 
First Session, World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), 17-19 
December 2001, p.87.  Available at http://portal.unesco.org/shs/en/ev.php-
URL_ID=2010&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html 
29 World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), Third session of the 
World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1-
4 December 2003, Proceedings, pp.95-105.    Available at: 
http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001343/134391e.pdf 
30 World Conference on Science, Science Agenda – Framework for Action, Budapest, Hungary, 26 June – 1 July 
1999.  Available at: http://www.unesco.org/science/wcs/eng/framework.htm 
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cooperation with UNESCO’s World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and 
Technology (COMEST), in cooperation with ICSU’s Standing Committee on Responsibility 
and Ethics of Sciences (SCRES).  The ethics and responsibility of science will become an 
integral part of science education and the training of scientists promoted by UNESCO.’ 
   
15.  Henk ten Have went on to note that in September 2002, the UN Policy Working Group 
on the United Nations and Terrorism had made Recommendation 21 relating to codes of 
conduct.  Following the endorsement by the General Assembly and the Security Council, this 
and other recommendations were sent to all Organizations and Specialized Agencies of the 
United Nations System.  At the invitation of the Director General of UNESCO, a UN Inter-
Agency Meeting was held at UNESCO Headquarters in Paris on 26 February 2003 
specifically to discuss Recommendations 10 and 21 of the report.  One of the outcomes of 
this UN Inter-Agency Meeting was a general recommendation towards ‘encouraging ethical 
codes of conduct for scientists and engineers’ and ‘promoting ethics of science education and 
awareness.’  The ethical task given by the World Conference on Science to COMEST and 
ICSU was recalled and reinforced.  One of the final recommendations of the UN Inter-
Agency Meeting was ‘that “existing relevant bodies such as COMEST could play a decisive 
role in fostering a continued dialogue on education and ethics of science”, also 
recommending the “specific involvement of the COMEST together with ICSU” in the field of 
the “responsibility of scientists”’  The presentation made at COMEST proposes that 
COMEST should seize the task received from the United Nations and the World Conference 
on Science so that work on this subject might be given at the next UNESCO General 
Conference in 2005 a mandate from the UNESCO Member States to prepare a declaration, 
including an oath or pledge, in this area by 2007.  The next step would be to highlight this in 
the report to be submitted to the UNESCO Executive Board at its next session in April 2004.  
The Executive Board meeting met from 14 to 28 April 2004 and decided31 in 169EX/SR.8 
that it: 
 
Welcomes UNESCO’s new orientation with regard to the ethics of science and 
technology 
 
Further requests the Director General to prepare a study, in cooperation with the 
International Council for Science, on the advisability of elaborating an international 
declaration on science ethics to serve as a basis for an ethical code of conduct for 
scientists; 
 
16. At the same COMEST meeting in Rio de Janeiro in 2003, there was a presentation32 
entitled Biology and codes of conduct by Roque Monteleone-Neto of Brazil in which recent 
international developments relating to the regime for the prohibition of biological weapons 
were outlined.  The paper examines how a code of conduct might be effective in regard to 
potentially dangerous research in biology and outlines some of the issues that need to be 
taken into account. 
 
17. In addition to the government and UN interest in codes described above, in December 
2001 and in 2002 several major scientific and medical organizations lent support to the 
                                                 
31 United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Executive Board, Decisions adopted by the 
Executive Board at its 169th Session, Paris, 14 – 28 April 2004, 169/EX Decisions, Paris, 25 May 2004.  
Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001346/134685e.pdf 
32 World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), Third session of the 
World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology (COMEST), Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 1-
4 December 2003, Proceedings, pp.109-113.    Available at: http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001343/ 
134391e.pdf 
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suggestion that codes might have some policy utility. The ASM reaffirmed that bioterrorism 
and ‘the use of microbes as biological weapons’ violated its Code of Ethics.33 Pax Christi 
called34 for pharmaceutical, chemical, biotechnological and other industries which have 
biotechnological installations to adopt an internal code of conduct to prevent abuse of their 
installations for biological weapons purposes. At its annual General Assembly, the World 
Medical Association adopted the Washington Declaration on Biological Weapons calling for 
‘all who participate in biomedical research to consider the implications and possible 
applications of their work and to weigh carefully in the balance the pursuit of scientific 
knowledge with their ethical responsibilities to society.’35   
 
18.  In the UK, the Royal Society in its response.36 37 in November 2002 to the Foreign Office 
Green Paper, gave its support to ‘codes of conduct that are developed by academic and 
professional bodies’ by stating: 
 
Addressing issues of scientific responsibility and ethics in research is an important but 
complex undertaking, which can only be tackled in a number of complementary ways. 
One is the agreement of a universal set of standards for research that can be 
incorporated into internationally-supported treaties; another is a concerted effort to 
increase awareness of international treaties and implicit codes of ethical conduct 
amongst researchers. 
 
At about the same time, in September 2002, the International Committee of the Red Cross 
launched its ‘Appeal on Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity’ to the political and military 
authorities and to the scientific and medical communities, industry and civil society on the 
potentially dangerous developments in biotechnology. 38 As part of this it asked political 
authorities ‘To encourage the development of effective codes of conduct by scientific and 
medical associations and by industry to govern activities and biological agents with potential 
for abuse’ and asked scientific and medical communities to ‘To adopt professional and 
industrial codes of conduct aimed at preventing the abuse of biological agents’.  
 
19.  Beside this support for codes of a general nature, some NGOs, who had expressed 
concern about activities carried out in some national biodefence programmes, had agreed 
draft recommendations for a code of conduct for biodefence programmes39 in which the 
following understandings were recommended for inclusion in a Code of Conduct: 
                                                 
33 American Society for Microbiology. Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing 
Openness and Security 10 October 2002. Available at http://www.asm.org/Policy/index.asp?bid=5703 
34 Pax Christi International, Pax Christi International Statement in Biological Weapons, Ref. SD.16.E.01, 
December 2001.  Available at: http://www.paxchristi.net/PDF/SD16E01 
35 World Medical Association. Declaration of Washington on Biological Weapons 17.400, 2002. Available at 
http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm 
36 Royal Society. Submission to FCO Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons 
Convention, Policy Document 25/02, November 2002.  Available at http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/files 
/statfiles/document-206.pdf 
37 See also May R Alberts B. Scientist support for biological weapon controls.  Science 8 November 2002 298: 
1135. 
38 International Committee of the Red Cross. Appeal on Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity Geneva, 25 
September 2002.  Available at http://www.icrc.org/Web/Eng/siteeng0.nsf/iwpList515/ 
274D020806432963C1256C3E005C4338 
39 In November 2002 the Federation of Atomic Scientists, Stockholm International Pease Research Institute, 
Verification Research, Training and Information Center, International Network of Engineers and Scientists for 
Global Responsibility, Acronym Institute for Disarmament Diplomacy, Sunshine Project, Pax Christi 
International, Physicians for Social Responsibility, and 20/20 Vision agreed draft recommendations for a code 
of conduct for biodefence programmes.  These were published as an Annex to Barbara Hatch Rosenberg, 
Defending against biodefence: the need for limits, Disarmament Diplomacy, Issue No. 69, February – March 
2003.  Available at: http://www.acronym.org.uk/ dd/dd69/69op03.htm 
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a) The development, production, stockpiling, acquisition or retention of all microbial 
or other biological agents or toxins of types and in quantities that have no 
justification for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes are prohibited by 
the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. This prohibition covers biological 
agents and toxins that are capable of causing temporary or permanent damage, harm 
or death to humans, animals, plants, materials of any kind or the environment. Work 
with any agents of these kinds is permissible only for protective or other peaceful 
purposes, and should be conducted only within the restrictions specified in the 
following points. 
 
b) The Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention contains no exemption for law 
enforcement, riot control or similar purposes. The development, production, 
stockpiling, acquisition or retention of microbial or other biological agents or toxins 
for these purposes, which are hostile, not peaceful, is therefore not permissible. 
 
c) The design, construction or possession, for any purpose, of delivery mechanisms 
designed to use biological agents or toxins for hostile purposes or in armed conflict is 
prohibited by the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention. There is no exemption 
for protective purposes. The Convention's stated goal is to preclude the use of 
biological weapons under any circumstance; therefore it is not permissible, even for 
defensive purposes, to construct delivery mechanisms designed for (i.e., having a 
design that is appropriate for) hostile use, whether or not hostile use is intended at the 
time of construction. 
 
d) Secrecy in biodefence programmes raises suspicions and could promote a race for 
offensive capabilities under cover of defence. Whereas the results of defence activities 
may need to be kept confidential, secrecy concerning the types or locations of defence 
activities undermines the Convention and should be disavowed. 
 
e) Construction of novel (i.e., not previously-existing) biological agents (including 
single-gene changes) for threat assessment is incompatible with the spirit and intent 
of theConvention, and should be disavowed. 
 
f) Weaponisation of active biological agents (defined in Note i) for defensive purposes 
also violates the spirit of the Convention and should be disavowed. Aerosolisation or 
other dissemination of active biological agents should be performed only in fully-
contained bench-scale environments and only for purposes of detection, prophylaxis 
or medical treatment. 
 
 
20. In November 2002, at the resumed Fifth Review Conference, the BTWC States Parties 
agreed to hold a series of one week annual meetings of the States Parties prepared for by a 
two week meeting of experts in 2003, 2004 and 2005 in the run-up to the 2006 Sixth Review 
Conference in order to ‘promote common understanding and effective action’ on one or two 
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topics each year.40, 41  In 2005, the topic for the meeting will be ‘The content, promulgation, 
and adoption of codes of conduct for scientists’.  
 
21. Since then attention to a code has continued to spread and its possible advantages 
repeated. In December 2002 the Foreign Affairs Committee of the UK House of Commons in 
its report42 on the Foreign Office Green Paper of April 2002 expressed concern that the States 
Parties to the BTWC would not consider the topic of codes of conduct until 2005 and made a 
recommendation that ‘We recommend that the Government take steps to promulgate an 
international code of conduct for scientists working with dangerous pathogens, even before 
the BTWC consider this matter in 2005.’ The UK Foreign Secretary in his response43 in 
February 2003 to this report said that ‘The Government plans therefore to begin work on a 
code of conduct this year.  … Officials from the FCO, MOD and DTI met the Royal Society 
on 22 January [2003] to consider inter alia how such a code might be taken forward.’ 
 
22.  The UK biomedical charity the Wellcome Trust in 2003 stated44 that ‘In order to 
promote best practice in the conduct of research and maintain public trust, the Trust 
considers that the international scientific community must take proactive steps to ensure that 
its members are aware of potential risks and concerns relating to terrorist misuse of 
research, and of the regulatory and ethical responsibilities that they hold. The Trust 
considers that the development of a ”code of conduct” for scientists could play an important 
role in this regard.’   Although it was noted that some reservations about the utility of a code 
were expressed by some industry and funding council representatives, the UK House of 
Commons Science and Technology Committee urged45 British learned societies and funding 
councils to  ‘consider introducing an overt ethical code of conduct as a prerequisite of 
membership and back this up with programmes to heighten awareness of the issues involved.’  
It went on to say that ‘if the scientific community does not take stronger action to regulate 
itself then it risks having ill-judged restrictions placed on it by politicians.’   It also 
recommended that ‘An ethical code of conduct for scientists has value in promoting 
awareness and providing basis for better education of researchers.  Learned and 
professional societies and Research Councils should develop an understanding of what such 
a code involves and enforce it by denying grants or refusing membership.  By insisting that a 
code of ethical conduct is unworkable they are ducking their responsibility.’   In its 
response46, the UK Government said that ‘The Government agrees that researchers should be 
                                                 
40 United Nations, Fifth Review Conference of the Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction, Geneva, 19 November - 7 December 2001 and 11 - 22 November 2002, Final Document, 
BWC/CONF.V/17, 2002.  Available at http://www.opbw.org 
41 Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, 
Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. Draft 
Decision of the Fifth Review Conference of the States Parties to the Convention on the Prohibition of the 
Development, Production and Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on their 
Destruction  BWC/CONF.V/CRP.3 6 November 2002. 
42 House of Commons, Foreign Affairs Committee, The Biological Weapons Green Paper, 11 December 2002.  
Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmfaff/150/150.pdf 
43 Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Response to First Report of the Foreign Affairs 
Committee, Session 2002 – 03, The Biological Weapons Green Paper, February 2003, Cm. 5713.  Available at 
http://fco.gov.uk/Files/kfiles/CM.5713.pdf 
44 Wellcome Trust. Wellcome Trust Position Statement on Bioterrorism and Biomedical Research.  2003 
Available at <www.wellcome.ac.uk/en/1/awtvispolter.html> 
45 House of Commons, Science and Technology Committee. The Scientific Response to Terrorism, 6 November, 
2003: paragraph 52. Available at http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmsctech/ 
415/415.pdf 
46 Secretary of State for the Home Department, The Government Reply to the Eight Report from the House of 
Commons Science and Technology Select Committee, Session 2002-03, HC 415-1, The Scientific Response to 
Terrorism, January 2004, Cm 6108.  Available at: http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/docs2/stc_report_reply.pdf 
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aware of ethical considerations relating to science and its wider applications.  The ethical 
code recommended by the Committee is an interesting proposal and we have already started 
consulting the research community on whether such a code is likely to deliver.’  The response 
goes on to note that ‘Further consultations will take place in 2004 in preparation for the 
meetings in 2005 under the auspices of the Biological Weapons Convention, where the issue 
of a Code of Conduct is to be considered.  The United Kingdom will chair the three weeks of 
discussion in Geneva.’ 
 
23.  As part of a wider education strategy to alert scientists about the dangers of bioterrorism 
and dual-use knowledge, in 2004 the US National Research Council report48 Biotechnology 
Research in an Age of Terrorism argued that ‘it is the responsibility of the research 
community, including scientific societies and organizations, to define what’ steps are needed 
to minimize the possibility that scientific knowledge will further biological weapons or 
bioterrorism and ‘to provide scientists with the education, skills, and support they need to 
honor these steps. These principles should be added to the codes of ethics of relevant 
professional societies’. In part as a response to this report, the goals49 specifically charged to 
the recently established US National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity include 
developing ‘Professional codes of conduct for scientists and laboratory workers that can be 
adopted by professional organizations and institutions engaged in life science research’.  
 
24. In March 2004 the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War indicated 
its support by stating that 'Science must be regulated by a code of ethics and guided by the 
Precautionary Principle.'50  In April 2004, as part of a document51 entitled The Individual 
and Collective Roles Scientists can Play in Strengthening International Treaties, the British 
Royal Society further elaborated its expectations for a code, shifting its explicit emphasis 
towards devising an enforceable code of practice. It stated that such codes ‘could include 
common elements such as general safety and ethical standards such as potential conflicts of 
interests, plagiarism and misrepresenting or exercising bias in recording and publishing 
data, as well as practical requirements such as the keeping of comprehensive and auditable 
laboratory records.  Specific elements may cover specific aspects of safety and security such 
as the handling of potentially dangerous material.  Good practice should also include the 
responsibility of scientists to be aware of and comply with the requirements of international 
conventions and treaties in their research area, This needs educational and research 
institutions to put in place the appropriateness measures to enable this requirement to be 
met.’  In May 2004, Pax Christi further elaborated52 its expectations for a code and other 
responsive measures necessary to prevent the spread of biological weapons.  It specifically 
stated that it was in favour of the following elements of such a code of conduct for scientists 
and industrialists: 
 
                                                 
47 House of Commons – Science and Technology Committee. The Scientific Response to Terrorism 6 November 
London: HMSO; 2003: paragraph 52. 
48 National Research Council. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism Committee on Research 
Standards and Practice to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press; 2004: 112. Available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10827.html 
49  National Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.  Available at  http://www4.od.nih.gov/nsabb/ 
50 International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, International Cooperation in Addressing the 
Risks Related to Biological Agents, 16-17 March 2004. Available at: 
http://www.ippnw.org/BiosecMcCoyNATO031604.html 
51 Royal Society, Paper on the individual and collective roles scientists can play in strengthening international 
treaties, Policy Document 05/04, April 2004. Available at: http://www.royalsoc.ac.uk/files/ statfiles/document-
256.pdf 
52 Pax Christi International, Pax Christi International Calls for Ethical Approach to Biological Weapons, Ref.: 
SD.08.E.04 Brussels, June 2004.  Available at http://www.paxchristi.net/PDF/SD08E04 .doc 
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• Life science research projects should systematically be evaluated by peers and 
funding bodies not only on scientific quality, but also on ethical aspects including 
the potential for use of the results for hostile purposes; 
 
• Research associations, institutions and individual researchers should maintain 
generally accepted standards for Good Laboratory and Manufacturing Practice, 
and take action against “bad science”; 
 
• Researchers who suspect colleagues of potential abuse of life science research and 
materials for hostile or illegal purposes should contact their superiors or the 
relevant authorities and blow the whistle; 
 
• Research associations should include regular debates about ethics in their 
meetings and publications, and include research into ethical legal and social 
aspects of science on a structural basis; 
 
• Life science students should be educated in ethics of science. 
 
25. Summary. There is a renewed interest in codes to apply to the scientific and industrial 
life sciences community.  Despite the extent and varied interest in a code or codes, there is a 
lack of detailed proposals about just what such a code or codes would entail.  A close 
reading of the initial proposals shows that there are different concepts about who should 
devise codes; whether they should be voluntary or enforceable; what purpose they might 
serve (e.g., raise awareness, proscribe specific actions); what issues they should cover; by 
what mechanisms they could be agreed; whether a new code is necessary or existing ones 
should be augmented; and whether there should be a single universal code or various local 
ones.  Taking these points together, a number of objectives and audiences can be identified:  
 
* Those engaged in the life sciences largely unaware of the possible ‘dual use’ 
implications of their work; 
* Those engaged in the life sciences actively deliberating what to do in relation to 
‘dual use’ experiments and experimental findings; 
* Members of professional life science organizations who believe concerns about 
biological weapons need to be addressed; 
* Conscientious practitioners in the life sciences in regard to less scrupulous 
colleagues;    
* Members of ‘the public’ who wish to see that concerns are being explicitly 
addressed;  
* Politicians seeking evidence that the scientific community is responding (so that it 
need not); 
* Would-be state and non-state actors that are considering initiating prohibited 
biological weapon programmes. 
 
With the range of objectives and audiences envisioned, multiple criteria could be used to 
judge the effectiveness of any code.  These could include whether they bring about compliant 
behavior, challenge existing ways of thinking about the implications of the life sciences, 
promote a basis for an equitable disarmament agenda, raise connections between hitherto 
unconnected security and research issues, and are responsive to future scientific innovations.    
 
 
Issues for Codes  
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26. Today there are many examples of codes that might serve as a model for devising a code 
for those engaged in the life sciences.53 54  While professional55 and business56 codes and 
oaths defining the responsibilities and rights of individuals and organizations have existed for 
some time, in recent years they have proliferated.  As indicated in the previous section, there 
is unlikely to be a single type of code that might be adopted.  Professional codes are often 
classified according to whether they aim to be aspirational, educational/advisory or 
enforceable (or a combination of these).57  This section distinguishes between different types 
of codes and offers some initial considerations for each in relation to a code for those 
engaged in the life sciences.  
 
27. Aspirational codes (often designated as ‘codes of ethics’) set out ideals that practitioners 
should uphold, such as standards of research integrity, honesty, or objectivity.  These may be 
realistic or idealistic.  In the case of a code for those engaged in the life sciences, following 
the concepts outlined earlier, this might include the call for those engaged in the life sciences 
to ‘consider the ethical implications’ of their work or to discourage any use of biology 
‘contrary to the welfare of humankind’.  A particular problem in drawing up codes that 
merely aim to aspire is that they may set out principles of such a general or banal nature as to 
be ineffective in regard to  everyday work.  Another is that they will almost certainly fail to 
dissuade those determined to breach them.  While aspirational professional codes on their 
own might not be effective in securing certain forms of individual behavior, they can 
nevertheless serve to draw further attention to particular areas of ethical and social concern 
and to enhance the awareness of those engaged in the life sciences.  
 
28. Educational/Advisory codes (often designated as ‘codes of conduct’) would go further 
than merely setting aspirations by providing guidelines suggesting how to act appropriately.  
In the case of biological weapons, this type of code could serve as a means for those involved 
in the life sciences to become sensitive to implications of their activities that they might 
otherwise have ignored.  A key issue in assessing the value of such educational/advisory 
codes is whether other initiatives might serve the same purpose in a more effective fashion58, 
59. 
 
29. Although there might appear to be widespread enthusiasm today for codes of ethics and 
conduct, this is not shared by many social scientists and ethicists.  Such analysts on the whole 
offer a more mixed (if not in the main skeptical) assessment of the overall effectiveness of 
professional and corporate codes that are not backed by formal requirements and enforcement 
mechanisms.60  Although there is often a presumption that ethical codes in science and 
engineering foster certain forms of behavior, little is known about their effectiveness in 
practice.61  Many analyses of corporate and professional codes cite the general lack of 
compliance as a major (perhaps the most significant) point of criticism; this arises from 
                                                 
53 See www.codesofconduct.org for many examples. 
54 Soskolne C Sieswerda L. Implementing ethics on the professions. Sci Eng Ethics 2003 9: 181-190. 
55 American Association for the Advancement of Science. Science and Society to Pledge or Not to Pledge: An 
Oath for Scientists? 19 February 2001. 
56 Kaptein M. Business codes of multinational firms. J Business Ethics 2004 50: 13-31. 
57 Fisher C. Developing a code of ethics for academics. Sci Eng Ethics 2003 9(2): 171-179. 
58 Harvard-Sussex Program.  Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under 
International Criminal Law See http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp/Draft%20Convention%20Feb04.pdf 
59 Medical Research Council. 1997. MRC Policy and Procedure for Inquiring into Allegations of Scientific 
Misconduct London: MRC. 
60 Cash M. Codes of ethics, organizational behaviour and misbehaviour. Research in Corporate Social 
Performance and Policy 1987 9: 107-130. 
61 Iverson M, Frankel M, Siage S. Scientific societies and research integrity. Sci Eng Ethics 2003 9: 141-158. 
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reasons such as the failure to punish contraventions.62 63  Some evidence suggests that such 
codes are rarely consulted or even known about by those they are meant to guide.64  Much, of 
course, depends on the rigor of the mechanisms in place to promote and uphold them.   
 
30.  A further problem is that general stipulations within codes often leave much scope for 
interpretation65.   An example is provided by the 1985 code of ethics adopted by the 
American Society for Microbiologists which discouraged ‘any use of microbiology contrary 
to the welfare of humankind’.  Reference to this code has been made by some66 as an example 
of what might be done in terms of a code for those engaged in the life sciences in regard to 
BW related concerns. Yet, what would count as adherence or deviation from such a call is 
unspecified and unclear.  According to Cassell, Miller, and Rest67, historically just what 
counts as acceptable practice vis-à-vis work in the life sciences in regard to biological 
weapons has been a matter of much debate and division within the ASM reflecting wider 
disputes about the legitimacy of the involvement of scientists in military R&D.  In 1970, for 
instance, the then ASM President R. Hungate supported continuing research into BW despite 
US President Nixon’s policy to end the production and use of biological weapons, attempts to 
agree the Biological Weapons Convention, and an ASM annual meeting resolution call to 
‘convert offensive biological warfare facilities to peaceful uses’.  He did so by suggesting 
BW research could aid in the prevention of disease, facilitate the development of 
incapacitating weapons, and minimize fears about what activities were being conducted.   
The establishment of the ASM Code of Ethics did not provide a retrospective resolution of 
any such debates.  With an increasing US interest in ‘non-lethal’ weapons and biodefence 
activities today, neither does it provide a clear guide for assessing action for many topics of 
international dispute. 
 
31. A further point is that general stipulations within codes sometimes conflict with each 
another68.   An example is given by the ethical code69 of the Australian Society for 
Microbiology which reads as follows: 
‘The Society Requires Each Member: 
1. to promote the aims of the Society;  
2. to behave in such a way as to bring credit to the profession of 
microbiology;  
3. to use all proper means to maintain the standards of the profession;  
4. to respect any confidence gained in the conduct of the profession;  
                                                 
62 Doig A Wilson J. The effectiveness of codes of conduct. J Business Ethics 1998 7(3): 140-149. 
63 Higgs-Kleyn N Kapelianis D. The role of professional codes in regulating ethical conduct. J Business Ethics 
19: 363-374 1999 
64 Luegenbiehl, C. Codes of ethics and the moral education of engineers. In: Johnson D. Ethical Issues in 
Engineering Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1991: 136-154. 
65 Shrader-Frechette K. Ethics of Scientific Research Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield; 1994. 
66 See for example, US Department of State (Bureau of Arms Control) New Ways to Strengthen the 
International Regime Against Biological Weapons Washington, DC 19 October 2001 and Royal Society. 
Submission to FCO Green Paper on Strengthening the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention November 
2002. 
67Cassell G, Miller L, Rest R. Biological Warfare: Role of Scientific Societies In The Microbiologist and 
Biological Defense Research Zilinskas, R (ed) New York: New York Academy of Science; 1994.  
68 So, for instance there might calls for engineers to both serve the interests of their clients and the public.  
Along these lines in relation to BW issues, a code might both include provisions stating the importance of 
conducting work to further knowledge and to consider limits on activities out of concern for its implications.   




5. to ensure that public statements are fair and objective;  
6. not to engage in microbiological practices restricted by law or 
professional agreement;  
7. to avoid unwarranted statements that reflect upon the character or 
integrity of other members of the profession;  
8. to recognise the responsibility to subordinates in terms of professional 
guidance and dissemination of information;  
9. to maintain professional competence by keeping abreast of new 
information and developments;  
10. to support fellow members who find themselves in difficulties on 
account of their adherence to this Code, and the Society in its efforts to protect 
them;  
11. to recognise responsibility to the community and the environment in 
protecting each from exposure to undue actual or potential microbiological 
hazards;  
12. not to engage knowingly in research for the production or promotion 
of biological warfare agents.’  
Item 12 prohibits knowingly contributing to the production or promotion of biological 
warfare agents.  In addressing ‘research’ rather than ‘development and production’ in its 
language the Code could be seen on the one hand as going beyond the prohibitions set out in 
the BTWC and on the other hand the omission of specific reference to development and 
production provides further ambiguity.  There is much to be said for using the all embracing 
word ‘work’ instead of ‘research’ in item 12.  
 
32.  Despite this apparent breadth, it is not explicit what the Australian code should be taken 
to proscribe in practice.  Consider the case of biodefence activities.  Historically ‘biodefence’ 
has been subject to competing interpretations about the acceptability and definition of various 
activities justified for protective measures.  Few70 have advocated a complete halt to such 
activities, allowing only civilian studies of naturally occurring infectious diseases that might 
aid in the basic understanding of virulence.  Yet the potential for defensive projects to further 
offensive capabilities (in terms of knowledge, techniques, or the availability of materials) has 
led some to express unease about the wisdom of taking part in biodefence work.  Even within 
the biodefence community, there has been some recognition of the need to ask questions 
about the ends that might be served (however inadvertently) by their activities.71  
 
33.  If item 12 were taken to apply to all biodefence research it would prevent microbiologists 
from undertaking any research to protect their nations’ troops and populations; a call which 
would be difficult to justify.  Also, such an interpretation could be reasonably be presented as 
conflicting with the provisions of items 9 and 11 which calls for microbiologists to keep 
‘abreast of new information and developments’ as well to protect the community and the 
environment from ‘actual or potential microbiological hazards’.  Even if biodefence is not 
ruled out altogether, the general point is that at any stage determining where the line should 
be drawn between ‘acceptable’ and ‘unacceptable’ activities, competing views about what is 
appropriate could justified by pointing to alternative Code items.   
 
                                                 
70 One such example is the Council for Responsible Genetics Call for a Ban on the Genetic Alteration of 
Pathogens for Destructive Purposes, n.d. Available at http://www.gene-watch.org/programs/biowarfare/call-for-
ban.html  
71 In The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research Zilinskas R. (ed) New York: New York Academy of 
Science; 1994. 
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34.  This can be further illustrated by the report72 in the New York Times in September 2001 
that ‘Over the past several years, the United States has embarked on a program of secret 
research on biological weapons that, some officials say, tests the limits of the global treaty 
banning such weapons’, specifically the article reported: (1) plans by the Defense 
Intelligence Agency (DIA) to genetically enhance the potency of the bacterium that causes 
anthrax, purportedly to test existing vaccines against a variant identified by Russian 
scientists; (2) the Central Intelligence Agency’s assembling and testing of an old Soviet 
cluster germ bomb; and (3) a project by the Pentagon to determine if a bioweapon plant could 
be fashioned from commercially available materials.  The latter two completed projects used 
simulants to test the devices built. While these activities were officially justified as falling 
under the banner of ‘threat assessment’, the legitimacy of this designation was widely 
disputed.  If a code similar to the one adopted by Australian Society for Microbiology had 
been in place in the US or internationally, those arguing for and against the undertaking of 
these ‘biodefence’ activities could have justified their opposing positions through reference to 
the code.  
 
35.  The argument can be made73 that the basic assumption that the abstract guidelines 
typically found in codes could resolve debates about what constitutes appropriate conduct 
misconstrues the nature of ethical decisions which cannot be made by fiat ahead of time.  
 
36.  In response to criticisms of codes of ethics and conduct, those supportive of them have 
argued they play more varied functions than guaranteeing certain forms of behavior.  These 
include raising awareness, suggesting considerations for reflection, fostering norms, enabling 
individuals to re-interpret their actions, clarifying individual and collective responsibilities, 
increasing public trust and establishing minimal ethical standards.74 75 76 77  The prospect is 
recognized that ethical codes can impact decision making for topics in which positions have 
not formed.78  Against such claims it has been countered that other activities might fulfill the 
same function more directly.  In practice codes have the disadvantage of being perceived as 
more a public relations device for professionals that act to stave off other and sometimes 
more prudent forms of regulation.79
 
37. Enforceable codes (often designated as ‘codes of practice’) seek to further codify what is 
regarded as acceptable behaviour.  Rather than inspiring or educating in the hopes of securing 
certain outcomes, enforceable codes are embedded within wider systems of professional or 
legal regulation.  While enforceable codes may share with other types of codes aims such as 
raising awareness, fostering norms, and clarifying individual and collective responsibilities, 
the focus here shifts to setting out certain permissible processes and ways of carrying out 
work.  
 
38. While such codes do not suffer from the same degree of prima facie doubt about their 
effectiveness that surrounds aspirational or educational types, their particular role with regard 
to those engaged in the life sciences in regard to BW issues may be less clear.  In recent 
                                                 
72 Miller, J., Engleberg, S. and Broad, W.J., US Germ Warfare Research Pushes Treaty Limits. New York Times. 
4 September 2001, p. 1. 
73 Ladd J. The question for a code of professional ethics. In: Johnson D Ethical Issues in Engineering Upper 
Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall; 1991:130-136. 
74 Davis M. Thinking Like an Engineer Oxford: Oxford University Press; 1998. 
75 Meselson M. Averting the exploitation of biotechnology. FAS Public Interest Report 2000 53: 5. 
76 Unger S. Code of engineering ethics. In: Johnson D Ethical Issues in Engineering Upper Saddle River, NJ: 
Prentice Hall; 1991: 105-130. 
77 Reiser S Bulger R. The social responsibilities of biological scientists. Sci Eng Ethics 1997 3(2): 137-143. 
78 Lere J Gaumnitz B Impact of codes on Ethics of Decision Making. J. Business Ethics 2003; 48: 365-379. 
79 Backof J Martin C. Historical perspectives. J Business Ethics 1991 10: 99-110. 
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years, a raft of national biosecurity legislation has been agreed in some countries to define 
appropriate behavior in relation to the physical and biological containment of pathogens.  In 
addition, various restrictions and requirements have been introduced on who can perform 
experiments, such as foreign nationals, and active attempts are continuing to introduce 
international legislation to criminalize individual’s engaged on biological weapons.80  To the 
extent any codes for those engaged in the life sciences in regard to biological weapons merely 
reiterate the provisions of such legislation, they risk being redundant.  However, the key 
requirement is enforcement whether it be of legislation or of a code of practice.  To the extent 
that a code may appear redundant, it risks being regarded as an inadequate measure by those 
seeking concrete reforms. 
 
39. Codes in general.  Much of the attention to codes today centres on getting those engaged 
in the life sciences to consider the risk of novel threats stemming from their experimental 
results or techniques; such considerations can be difficult to legislate through highly 
formalized codes.  Following on from fairly high profile experiments such as the insertion of 
the interleukin-4 gene into the mousepox virus and the artificial chemical synthesis of the 
poliovirus, contemporary policy discussions are not only concerned with development efforts 
or physical security requirements, but also with the security risks posed by findings and 
techniques stemming from otherwise acceptable academic, industrial or medical activities (so 
called ‘contentious research’ or ‘experiments of concern’).  Making determinations about the 
wisdom of undertaking a particular line of work or how it should be communicated could 
require assessing complicated and uncertain matters about its future beneficial and negative 
consequences.81  Yet, in relation to such speculative concerns, what is foreseeable, desirable, 
or even relevant to assessing risks and benefits has82 83 and almost certainly will be a 
continuing source of debate.84  Just who should or could make determinations of risks and 
benefits is yet another issue. 
 
40. Such points raised suggest that there is little justification for assuming the establishment 
of a code of conduct in and of itself will be advantageous.  This underlines the importance of 
paying careful attention to the motivations for codes and what specific functions they are 
supposed to fulfill.  These might include abating professional criticism, altering inappropriate 
actions, making informal community standards formal, or bringing a new way of thinking to 
old issues.  Closely related is the question of who is the primarily audience for codes; 
whether that be individuals engaged in the life sciences, government policy makers, industry 
or the public.   The question needs to be asked as to whether a code is primarily seeking to 
dictate terms of acceptable behavior, to encourage active reflection on what constitutes 
appropriate behavior or to set out a routine process of evaluation.  
 
Issues to be Considered in Responding to BW Threats with Codes  
 
41. In light of these general observations about codes, this section considers some of the 
issues especially pertinent in thinking today about codes for those engaged in the life sciences 
in regard to biological weapons concerns.  Some of the issues are especially relevant to 
                                                 
80 Harvard-Sussex Program.  Draft Convention to Prohibit Biological and Chemical Weapons under 
International Criminal Law See http://www.sussex.ac.uk/spru/hsp/Draft%20Convention%20Feb04.pdf 
81 Nixdorff K Bender W. Ethics of university research, biotechnology and potential military spin-off. Minerva 
2002 40: 15-35. 
82 Dennis C. The bugs of war Nature 17 May 2001: 232-5. 
83 Műllbacher A Logbis M. Creation of killer poxvirus could have been predicted. J Virol September 2001: 
8353-5. 
84 Rappert B. Coding ethical behaviour. Sci Eng Ethics 2003 9(4). 
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particular types code, but each also has a generic relevance. Examining these further 
highlights the need to attend to the motivations and expectations for introducing codes.  
 
One Code or Many? 
 
42. As indicated in the statement by the United States85, it has been proposed that a single 
code with universal recognition be adopted.  Agreeing one code for the whole of the 
international life sciences community would have certain obvious practical advantages.  
Because of the transnational values and norms of science, many past discussions regarding 
codes have also emphasized the importance of universality.    
 
43. However desirable, achieving universality in practice would depend on the nature of the 
code.  It might be relatively easy to adopt an aspirational code internationally and the same 
could be true of an enforceable code of practice especially if this were to be incorporated in 
an existing widely adopted code of practice.  It should be noted however that the general 
approach of seeking to specify appropriate behavior through codes of conduct is much more 
prevalent in Western countries (and particularly the US) than the rest of the world.86  Second, 
to the extent the code attempts to set out enforceable standards specifying good practice, it is 
likely to require considerable effort to result in ‘universal’ practices as a code embedded into 
different regulatory contexts could result in different practices.  Elsewhere, Jasanoff contends 
that despite the long interest in setting standards for scientific integrity, the diversity of 
practices between scientific specialties means that the establishment of uniform standards has 
proven ever elusive.87  In addition, whatever its desirability, today considerable disparity 
exists across the globe in how ethical reviews are undertaken for biomedical research.88 89  
Local and national reviews of the implications of research in relation to biological weapons 
concerns could face the same difficulties.  Even current biosafety90 standards which also 
provide much of the basis for biosecurity containment measures vary considerable between 
countries.91  With the establishment of the US National Advisory Board for Biosecurity in the 
US and the introduction of additional vetting of research proposals, the disparity in regulatory 
environments is likely to become more pronounced over the next few years. More 
productively, the establishment and negotiation of a code that strove toward universality 
could serve as a vehicle for benchmarking different standards internationally.   
 
44. However, if codes were to be aspirational and thus contain statements condemning the 
use of work in the life sciences for hostile purposes by basically reiterating Article I of the 
BTWC, then universal codes might be adopted widely.  However, what such aspirational 
codes might mean for what is permissible is not likely to be a matter of unanimity.  In the 
past what has counted as the ‘prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes’ of 
                                                 
85 US Department of State (Bureau of Arms Control) New Ways to Strengthen the International Regime Against 
Biological Weapons Washington, DC 19 October 2001 
86 Kaptein M and Wempe J. Twelve Gordian knots when developing an organizational code of ethics. J Business 
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87 Jasanoff S. Innovation and integrity in biomedical research. Academic Medicine 1993 S91-S95. 
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89 MacPherson C. Research ethics. Developing World Bioethics 2001 1: 57-69. 
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measures ‘designed to prevent unauthorised acquisition of pathogens, toxins or other bioactive substances of 
biological origin – to prevent their potential misuses inconsistent with the provisions of the BTWC’ whereas 
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91 Pearson G Preparing for the First Meeting of the States Parties: II: Security and Oversight of Pathogenic 
Microorganisms and Toxins University of Bradford, Department of Peace Studies, Briefing Paper No. 9 (Second 
Series), October 2003. Available at http://www.brad.ac.uk/acad/sbtwc/  
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biological agents or toxins has been a matter of disagreement in relation to the acceptability 
of activities undertaken as part of ‘biodefence’ programmes.92 93  Today the renewed interest 
in the US, Russia, and elsewhere into ‘non-lethal’ incapacitanting agents that span the bio-
chemical spectrum likewise challenges the presumption that general statements condemning 
the use of biological and toxin agents for hostile purposes could provide a solid foundation 
for consistent practice.94  As noted earlier, some NGOs have put forward suggestions as to 
what might be incorporated in a code of conduct for biodefence programmes. Achieving 
shared international agreement between States Parties on the criteria for determining the 
acceptability of biodefence programmes could be challenging. 
 
45. Moreover, whatever is agreed by way of the content of codes, how they will be 
interpreted in practice is another matter.  While ethical codes might purport to offer universal 
standards for evaluating appropriate action, their interpretation and enforcement cannot be 
divorced from questions of power and authority.  As in past debates about the appropriateness 
of biodefence projects, what counts as a permissible activity is not simply a function of what 
takes place, but who is in a position to impose and resist assessments.  Along these lines, as 
part of a critical analysis of the activities reported as part of the US biodefence programme, it 
has been noted that ‘similar activities in other countries have led the United States to label 
them biological weapon proliferators. Yet no doubt those countries would ascribe their 
activities to benign "threat assessment" necessary to develop appropriate military defenses 
and medical treatments, just as the U.S. is now describing its activities.’95  The potential for 
some countries to dismiss concerns about its activities again raises the issue of whether a 
code setting out universal working standards could be internationally negotiated.  
 
46. So far this sub-section has considered the universality of the provisions of codes in 
relation to issues about their coverage.  This though is not the only issue that arises regarding 
whether one or many codes are appropriate.  Another issue is whether a distinct and separate 
code addressing particular concerns relating to biological weapons is sought or whether 
standards relating to biological weapons should be integrated into existing industrial, 
organizational or professional codes.  While the former approach would require (to some 
extent) a ‘new’ code to be formulated, the latter would require existing codes to be modified.  
The two approaches would have different practical issues in respect of their promulgation.  In 
addition, the two approaches may well reflect differences in the priority and responsibility for 
preventing the hostile use of biological and toxin agents.  If, for instance, the topic is to be 
included within existing codes, then questions about the implementation and utility of 
provisions relating to biological weapons will depend on the overall implementation 
procedures and utility of the codes in which they are embedded which can vary considerably.  
Some might suggest that many of the existing provisions of such codes already call for 
standards of ethical and legal conduct that would rule out the development of biological 
weapons and so this topic need not be covered as explicitly.  Such an appraisal is likely to be 
challenged by those that maintain the development of biological weapons is so grossly 
abhorrent or in need of attention today that special efforts must be taken.96, 97, 98, 99  Although 
securing agreement on a separate code on its own may well bring greater attention to the 
                                                 
92 Zilinskas R. ed. The Microbiologist and Biological Defense Research New York: New York Academy of 
Science; 1994.  In terms of the BTWC, one point of concern has been what, if anything, distinguishes ‘research’ 
from ‘development’ as the former word is not explicitly addressed in the Convention. 
93 Leitenberg M. Biological Weapons in the Twentieth Century: A Review and Analysis 2002 see 
http://www.fas.org/bwc/papers/21centurybw.htm 
94 Wheelis M Dando M. Back to bioweapons?  Bull Atomic Scientists 2003 59. 
95 Rosenberg B Leitenberg M. Who’s afraid of a germ warfare treaty. LA Times 6 September 2001. See also 
Bolton J Beyond the axis of evil: additional threats from weapons of mass destruction.  Heritage Lecture No. 
743.  Washington DC: Heritage Foundation; 2002. 
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topic of biological weapons and enable more in-depth treatment of the issues at hand, it may 
well be much harder to achieve consensus and take much longer.  
 
Outcome or Process? 
 
47. While much of the current discussion of codes to address biological weapons issues 
centre on their utility once they are drawn up, many of those social scientists that offer 
positive overall assessments of codes stress the process benefits associated with devising and 
revising codes.  The phrase ‘a code is nothing, coding is everything’ has been used to 
highlight the significance of procedural aspects. Particularly with regard to the educational 
aim of raising awareness, posing the issue of what constitutes appropriate conduct through a 
process of devising a code can have many benefits. Some existing professional codes make a 
positive virtue out of ambiguity and uncertainty by drawing attention to their limits as 
standard setting devices and thereby the importance of process considerations.100
 
48. Reflection on the process advantages of codes would suggest the speed by which they are 
finalized is not of vital importance nor is the status of any code as universal.  What is needed 
instead is a process of formulating codes that is fairly explicit about its presumptions and that 
seeks to engage a wide range of participants over time.  Initial disagreement might well prove 
productive in terms of achieving a more effective code in the long term and also suggesting 
alternative possibilities.  With regard to the latter, in keeping with international differences 
found in relation to industrial codes of conduct, codes relating to biological weapons issues 
from different regions of the globe might alternatively stress the importance of transparency 
measures versus explicitly prescribing what counts as appropriate behavior.    
 
49. These themes are particularly salient in considering biological weapons because, as 
indicated above, there is not uniform agreement about the acceptability of certain activities 
and probably relatively little knowledge of the salient issues among many of those engaged in 
the life sciences.  Asking and re-asking what a code should entail is one way of fostering 
debate about what constitutes appropriate action and thereby encouraging cultures where 
concerns about the threats of biological weapons are more prevalent.  Such a process-based 
approach though may not be regarded by some as adequate evidence that the scientific 
community is taking sufficient responsive action.  Whatever the mix of process and product, 
it should be borne in mind that professional and organizational codes of conduct often change 
over time as a sense of the problem which they are meant to address and the necessary 
responsive measures develop.101  So any international code or codes addressing biological 
weapons issues will need a mechanism for its review and revision.  
 
Codifiers or Clarifiers? 
 
50. Another issue is whether codes should merely seek to reiterate the existing provisions of 
national and international agreements and conventions, or whether they attempt to further a 
                                                 
96 Atlas R. ASM Testimony: Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing Openness and 
Security House Committee on Science "Conducting Research During the War on Terrorism: Balancing 
Openness and Security."  October 10, 2002. See http://www.asm.org/Policy/index.asp?bid=9595 
97 House of Commons – Science and Technology Committee. The Scientific Response to Terrorism 6 November 
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98 Stimson Center. Compliance through Science: US Pharmaceutical Industry Experts on a Strengthened 
Bioweapons Nonproliferation Regime September 2002.
99 Petro J Plasse T McNulty J. Biotechnology: impact on biological warfare and biodefense. Bioterrorism & 
Biosecurity 2003 1: 161-168. 
100 Gotterbarn D. Not all codes are created equal. J Business Ethics 1999 22: 81-89. 
101 Backof J Martin C. Historical perspectives. J Business Ethics 1991 10: 99-110. 
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shared understanding of their meaning.  As part of its April 2004 statement on The Individual 
and Collective Roles of Scientists, the Royal Society called on the scientific community to 
‘comply with requirements of both national legislation and international treaties and 
conventions.’102  One difficulty in achieving this is whether those in the life sciences are 
knowledgeable of the provisions of such legislation, treaties and conventions.  More 
importantly though is the underlying issue as to what these agreements mean in the first 
place.  Much has been achieved by the States Parties through their reaffirmations at 
successive Review Conferences.  Although biodefence and non-lethal weapons have been 
noted above as contentious issues, they have not yet been the subject of reaffirmations at the 
Review Conferences although proposals were made103 that would have been a step forward at 
the Fifth Review Conference in 2001/2002, had that succeeded in agreeing a Final 
Declaration. Even outside of such fairly high profile disputed topics, international agreements 
typically entail a high degree of abstraction and generalization; this is often a result of the 
competing agendas at play in international negotiations.  The BTWC is a convention written 
for State Parties and not a text which is meant to guide the actions of individuals. 
 
51. In such a situation, a key issue is where responsibility rests for determining what ought to 
be done.104  Of course, in the end it is important to ensure individuals make appropriate 
ethical decisions.  Yet, just whether the responsibility for determining what counts as the 
prudent course of action should solely rest with individuals is another matter.105  If a scientist 
or a team of them are left to their own devices to interpret highly contentious and complex 
issues because a code suggests it is their responsibility to do so, its ultimate utility is likely to 
be limited.  There can be advantage in a tiered approach involving appropriate national and 
possibly international bodies to consider and advise on particularly difficult issues. 
 
52. While it is illusionary to imagine a formal written code of conduct can resolve all ethical 
dilemmas or uncertainties under their domain, they can aid in setting out how dilemmas are 
approached and how responsibility should be distributed between individuals and 
organizations. Professional associations offering codes or other measures can also aid 
individual decision making by providing a sense of the wider context in which scientists 
should situate their individual efforts such as the future possibilities that might become 
possible from scientific advances.  Through the adoption of codes, organizations or 
professional bodies can either forward a sense of what conventions should mean or restate the 
terms of existing agreements.  Attempts to clarify the meaning of existing conventions need 
not only take the form of statements about the rights and wrongs of particular topics, but 
instead could include the agreement of guiding principles.  For instance, in a discussion of 
professional codes of conduct for anthropologists, Sluka suggested the discipline should be 
directed by: an overriding responsibility to those studied, the censuring of covert research, the 
                                                 
102 Royal Society The Individual and Collective Roles of Scientists April 2004: 3. 
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importance of accountability for ethical violations, and the prioritization of public duty over 
private interests.106   
 
Extenders or Consolidators?  
 
53. Another set of issues related to whether codes reiterate or further understanding is 
whether they attempt to build on existing practices and controls or whether they pursue a 
more restrictive line of bringing together what already exists. 
 
54. Some of the attention to codes today is to address the need to ensure strict controls are in 
place for the physical and biological containment of pathogens and toxins.  Should codes be 
limited to this topic though, they are unlikely to result in significant changes to current 
practices in many countries.  The raft of biosecurity measures introduced across the globe 
post 9-11 means that codes in this regard may be considered as nothing more than a 
consolidation of existing regulations.  In contrast, a key area of contention is the issue of how 
far policy concerns about biological threats should extend in the United States beyond 
traditional select agents to impact a wide range of activities currently not affected by 
biosecurity regulations.107  Another issue is whether codes challenge existing practice about 
who should take part in setting standards.  Conceding a role for a code of ethics or conduct 
may well necessitate engaging in debates about the social responsibilities of those 
undertaking work relevant to the life sciences; a matter where ‘society’ and well as ‘science’ 
has a legitimate voice.108   
 
55. As noted above, those critical of codes have argued their adoption often serves as a ‘soft 
touch’ measure that avoids of other forms of regulation while giving the appearance that 
responsive action has been taken.109   If confined to existing regulatory provisions, codes for 
those engaged in the life sciences in regard to biological weapons issues may well be 
regarded in the same light.  The general enthusiasm for codes in policy discussions coupled 
with a lack of attention to what the codes will be might be taken as indicating some are 
seeking them in lieu of other controls. There is at least some explicit recognition that codes 
might be thought of a means of avoiding forms of more stringent or external regulation.  In 
relation to the dual-use implications of biological research, the American Society for 
Microbiology has argued ‘that a self-imposed code of responsible conduct and oversight is 
preferable to a mandated regime.’110  The biomedical charity the Wellcome Trust has given 
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initial endorsement to the idea of a code, but squarely as part of a system of self-governance 
by the scientific community.  
 
Codes under the BTWC 
 
56. The topics of potential disagreement about the purpose and place of codes discussed 
above are further compounded by contrasting assessments regarding the proper vehicle by 
which they might be adopted.  While the multilateral Meetings of Experts and of State Parties 
in 2005 under the BTWC provide a forum for discussing international codes, it could be 
argued that the current US administration does not regard this venue highly.  Many security 
analysts have interpreted the decisions of US officials during and since the Fifth Review 
Conference as an indication of a lack of desire to see substantive progress under the 
Convention in the next few years.111  The US imposed limits on the annual multilateral 
meetings – their status as non-negotiations, the necessary stand alone quality of each year’s 
topic, and the constraints on their duration – likewise have been taken as a clear indication of 
the desire to marginalize the BTWC.  The US orientation contrasts with that of other 
countries who have actively sought to strengthen the BTWC.  For supporters, a failure, as 
happened in the 2003 meetings, to promote significant ‘common understanding and effective 
action’ in the 2005 meetings would be another significant and regrettable set back to the 
BTWC as a viable and relevant agreement.  It could be argued that radically divergent 
expectations exist for the 2005 meetings on codes of conduct deriving from different political 
assessments regarding the proper direction of arms control.   
 
Issues for a Code of Conduct for those engaged in the life sciences in regard to biological 
weapons aspects. 
 
57. The analysis given in the last two main sections suggests a number of issues need to be 
considered as part of the establishment of codes of conduct for those engaged in the life 
sciences.  These issues are listed below, although the list is not exhaustive nor does the order 
indicate their relative importance:   
 
* Which is the relevant community to make decisions about what codes should be 
adopted?  Should ‘the’ scientific community alone determine the composition of 
codes intended for them? In what ways is the ‘prevention against biowarfare and 
bioterrorism…too important to leave to the scientists and politicians’112? 
* How will any future codes combine both individual and collective responsibilities?  
* Will codes consist of standards that go beyond existing regulatory provisions in 
terms of their rigor or specificity?   
* What is the question to which codes are being sought as an answer?  As part of this, 
what is the potential for codes to keep abreast of current scientific developments that 
might facilitate the development of biological weapons? 
* Does a long term and widespread commitment exist among the relevant 
organizations to implement codes effectively?  
* By what criteria might a code be deemed effective?  Is ‘keeping the conversation 
going’ about the potential security problems of the life sciences sufficient? 
* To what extent are differences in the implementing countries in the adoption of 
codes and well as other regulatory measures acceptable?   
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* Should codes seek to elaborate and clarify existing international conventions? 
Should discussions undertaken as part of such conventions elaborate and clarify the 
meaning of codes?  Related to this, is the purpose of codes to resolve international 
disagreements about the advisability of some actions? 
* In what way is the fate of any code implicated in other areas of policy? 
* Who are codes for: workers on the bench, professional organizations, government 
negotiators, those in industry, the public, etc.? 
* Are codes being brought in to stave off other controls?  
* Is it realistic to expect that common standards in practice for ‘the’ life science 
community across sub-disciplines and nations? 
* Can guiding principles be agreed for setting and interpreting codes?  
* What positive commitments exist for scientists to consider the social and ethical 
implications of their work?  
* Is calling for ‘compliance’ to existing national legislation and international 
agreements sufficient?  To what extent is it possible? 
* How can the effectiveness of codes be gauged?  Is it realistic or helpful to assume 
common criteria should apply across disciplines and countries?  
* Are governments, professional organizations, funders, NGOs and others willing to 
take a stance on the proper interpretation of international weapons agreements?   
* Could new code(s) alleviate or exacerbate the deficiencies of existing codes? 
* Irrespective of questions about scientists’ knowledge of international prohibitions, is 
there sufficient recognition of the dual-use possibilities stemming from work in the 
life sciences?  Is there a significant problem to be recognized at all? 
* Is the discussion of a code a way of engaging with potentially contentious political 
questions or a way of avoiding them?   
 
 
A Code Matrix  
 
58. The previous sections considered various issues related to the establishment and 
promulgation of a life sciences code in relation to biological weapons aspects.  While 
increasing attention is being given to this policy option by a wide range of organizations, the 
utility of codes should not be taken for granted.   Codes should perhaps be better thought of 
as means, rather than as ends in themselves.  A code that specifies enforceable standards 
based on existing regulations risks being redundant whereas one aiming to be aspirational 
risks being irrelevant.   
 
59. Such an analysis makes it easy to outline some elements of a single code that could prove 
of limited relevance.  A code that merely stated vague provisions such as ‘Just do the right 
thing’, ‘Don’t build a germ bomb’, and that had no provisions in place for future re-
evaluation, or that was not owned and supported by the relevant organizations could mean a 
code that is simply a shiny document that quickly gathers dust.   
 
60. Specifying a useful and effective code or codes is more difficult.  Codes that set out 
standards in novel areas, that contextualize and make connections, that provide detailed 
expectations for behavior, and that act as a device for ‘keeping the conversation going’ about 
what should be done are more likely to prove beneficial.  Exactly what sort of code is 
appropriate and by what measure its effectiveness should be judged though depends on why 
codes are sought and who is their expected audience.  In relation to matters of audience, this 
analysis has focused on those engaged in the life sciences, as almost all of the present policy 
discussion takes this group as the pertinent one for focus.  However, it needs to be recognized 
that there is a wide range of expertise that is involved in the life sciences such as policy-
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makers, regulators, investors and others who equally have responsibilities to prevent the 
hostile misuse of the life sciences.113  In regard to purpose, this analysis has argued that codes 
can have more varied functions than solely proscribing action.  Based on the previous 
analysis, a variety of laudable aims for codes in the life sciences in respect of biological 
weapons can be identified:  
 
1. Raise awareness of the potential for the hostile use of biological agents among 
relevant professionals and organizations; 
2. Reinforce or otherwise take forward standards for the biological and physical 
containment of pathogens and toxins; 
3. Enable individuals to re-examine their actions by establishing a sense of the social 
and ethical context in which science takes place; 
4. Facilitate a process of long term discussion about the possible implications of the 
life sciences and what sorts of controls might be prudent; 
5. Clarify individual and collective professional responsibilities; 
6. Provide modest impediment to the involvement of individuals in inappropriate 
programmes of work, whether that be explicitly offensive programmes or otherwise 
questionable projects;  
7. Encourage scientists to be aware of and comply with the requirements of 
international conventions while at the same time working towards the clarification of 
their meaning. 
 
Even for this limited set of aims no one type of code is likely to serve them all adequately. 
 
61.  If codes are assumed to be worth pursuing and a commitment is made to their 
promulgation, one possible way forward is to develop and adopt an integrated ‘matrix of 
codes’114 that would consist of different types fulfilling a range of aims for varied audiences.  
Although single code initiatives on their own might have limited utility, taken together they 
could provide one element of a more comprehensive response to biological weapon threats 
which has been referred to as a ‘web of prevention’115 or ‘web of deterrence’116.  Such a 
matrix could build on current and planned code related activities while identifying useful 
additional measures and points of integration.  This section outlines the shape of such a 
possible matrix.  It does not seek to resolve all the issues but indicates the significance and 
general outline of a matrix approach.  For simplicity, it does so by reference to the state of 
codes and other forms of regulation in the UK.  Proposals are made as to how existing 
provisions might be modified.   
 
Matrix Element 1 -- Enforceable Codes: Developing Existing Regulations  
 
62. It was argued earlier that monitoring and enforcement mechanisms are essential for 
ensuring codes fulfil their intended function.  In relation to the issues discussed so far, 
controls on the physical and biological containment of pathogens and toxins are most 
amenable to this sort of formalized enforcement regime.  In the UK, a code of practice could 
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be based on regulations such as the 2001 UK Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act117, the 
Genetically Modified Organisms (Contained Use) Regulations 2000118 or more general 
documents such as the UK Medical Research Council’s Policy and Procedure for Inquiring 
into Allegations of Scientific Misconduct.119  
 
63. A code of good practice bringing together and reiterating the provisions of existing codes 
and regulations might provide a limited added value in complying and clarifying controls.  
The introduction of such a code might also bring greater attention to the issues at hand.  Yet, 
as argued above, it is important to find ways of taking further existing code of practice-
related initiatives as well.  Pearson has offered one such proposal for incorporating BW 
concerns within the existing routine procedures for evaluating scientific and medical work.120  
He takes as his starting points both the need to reaffirm the core tenet of the BTWC that 
microbial or other biological agents should only be used in types and quantities that can be 
justified for prophylactic, protective or other peaceful purposes as well as the limited 
prospects for achieving agreement on an international code in the 2005 BTWC discussions.  
The proposal is to build on existing national and international health and safety regulations121 
by establishing a code of practice requiring that current hazard assessments of scientific 
activities also consider their legality under obligations deriving from prohibition agreements 
which in the UK are those in the Biological Weapons Act 1974122 and the Chemical Weapons 
Act 1996123.  In this manner, considerations about the control of biological weapons would be 
integrated into everyday practices of varied communities engaged in the life sciences with 
little additional regulatory burden.  Since not all countries have taken the necessary measures 
to bring into force the national implementation measures set out in the BTWC,124 this 
approach could have the added benefit of drawing attention to the need for such national 
implementation action.   
 
64.  The proposal by the US National Research Council in its report Biotechnology Research 
in an Age of Terrorism125 to expand the existing NIH rDNA review procedures for seven 
categories of ‘experiments of concern’ might inform an enforceable code.  The NRC 
suggested that proposals falling under these categories should be submitted to Local 
Institutional Biosafety Committees for ‘assessment’ regarding their security, rather than just 
biosafety, implications.  An expanded national board could then be convened to examine the 
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most difficult proposals, a role now to be fulfilled in the US by the newly created National 
Science Advisory Board for Biosecurity.   
 
65. It is not yet clear what criteria will be used to judge individual projects against or how 
this oversight system will function.  A survey126 of institutional biosafety committees in the 
US has identified a number of biosafety shortcomings in regard to the assessment of work 
involving dangerous pathogens.  The value of such pre-experiment assessments depends, in 
part, on the extent to which the results and implications of these activities are foreseeable.  
Leaving it up to individuals or groups in biosafety committees to anticipate issues of concern 
is a questionable strategy to the extent that experiments yield unpredictable results. However, 
a parallel approach has long been taken in regard to ethical committees considering 
experiments involving human subjects. Specifying procedures for reporting significant ‘dual 
use’ findings might be another line to pursue as part of enacting an enforceable code.   
 
66.  In international terms, while the enforceable measures discussed above might not pose a 
significant burden on some countries, the approach to globalisation in world trade means that 
increasingly all countries are adopting similar standards.  Although current procedures and 
infrastructures for monitoring and evaluating scientific and medical work vary considerably 
around the world, efforts are increasingly being made to harmonise such procedures and 
infrastructures.   
 
Matrix Element 2 -- Aspirational Codes: Raising the Awareness of Biological Weapons  
 
67.  Section 3 noted a number of critical issues about the possible contribution of aspirational 
codes.  As argued, such codes often conceal more than they clarify and past experience in 
industry and elsewhere would suggest that their effect on behavior is modest at best.  In 
relation to offensive biological weapons development, past experience with programmes in 
the Soviet Union, South Africa, and Iraq would suggest the array of oaths, conventions and 
public condemnations relevant to biological weapons did little to dissuade the participation of 
physicians and scientists.127 128  However, international standards and positions are constantly 
changing and what might have been true in the second half of the 20th century need not be 
true in the 21st century. 
 
68. Aspirational codes on their own are quite limited options.  However, as part of an 
integrated matrix, the adoption of such codes might raise the profile of biological weapons, 
particularly for policy makers within funding bodies, professional societies, and similar 
organizations, and facilitate future action.  Whatever the indeterminacy of the American 
Society for Microbiologists code of ethics, for instance, it has provided a platform for 
members concerned about biological weapons to link their concerns to an official statement 
of the Society.  In the UK, few industrial or scientific organizations make any explicit 
reference to biological weapons as part of their codes or standards.  Merely agreeing the 
relevancy of biological weapons as a topic of concern would have the potential advantage of 
facilitating subsequent action, even if it did not lead to action today.  Existing examples of 
such codes include The American Phytopathological Societies Position on Biological 
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Weapons129, Australian Society for Microbiology Code of Ethics130, EuropaBio Code of 
Conduct131 and the ethical principles of BIOTECanada.132
 
Matrix Element 3 -- Educational/Advisory Codes: Provoking Debate about the Place of 
Science in Society  
 
69. While enforceable codes of practice could help to impose agreed standards and 
procedures and aspirational codes could provide a basis for furthering awareness of biological 
weapons within organizations, educational or advisory codes could promote dialogue about 
the problem of the hostile use of the life sciences and the wisdom of any responsive 
measures.  This Briefing Paper has suggested ‘codes of conduct’ are at their best when they 
seek to encourage and enable individuals to reinterpret their actions.  Since the issues 
associated with BW codes today are going to be far more complex than simply forbidding 
participation in offensive weapons programmes, there is ample scope for useful discussion.  
The ‘lack of teeth’ of such codes is only a major problem if they are conceived as a means of 
ensuring certain forms of behavior.  Instead of performing this function, such codes can seek 
to encourage individuals and groups to assume a position of responsibility as moral agents, 
though the ultimate ability of codes to do this is highly dependent on the process of their 
adoption and revision.  Codes agreed by one group can also signal to others what should be 
treated as a topic of concern.   
 
70. Although enforceable or aspirational biological weapons related stipulations could be 
incorporated within existing codes, it can be argued that a distinct document is needed in the 
case of an educational code to elaborate in some detail an appreciation of the possible issues 
at stake.  An example of such a code for those that conduct, fund, administer, and regulate 
work in the biosciences and biomedicine is provided below.  It has been assembled, in part, 
by directly drawing on varied agreed declarations, codes and conventions (see Annex A).  It 
includes a wide range of stipulations, some which might be classified as ‘advisory’ and others 
as ‘enforceable’. 
 
Preventing the Hostile Use of the Life Sciences  
 
Every major technology - metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, 
electronics, nuclear energy - has been intensively exploited, not only for peaceful 
purposes but also for hostile ones.  The rapid developments across the life sciences 
today not only bring the possibility of improving human health, but the risk that the 
knowledge and techniques gained will be turned towards the deliberate spread of 
disease.   
 
This risk is not confined to traditional pathogens and toxins of concern; in addition, 
the fields of molecular biology, neuroscience, biological control and many others are 
                                                 
129 The American Phytopathological Society, APS net, The American Phytopathological Societies Position on 
Biological Weapons. Available at http://www.apsnet.org/media/ps/bioweapons.asp 
130 The Australian Society for Microbiology, Ethics.  Available at: http://www.theasm.com.au/docs/ethics/ 
default.asp 
131 EuropaBio, The European Association for Bioindustries, Europabio’s Core Ethical Values, October 1998.  
Available at http://www.europabio.org/documents/ev_en.pdf 
132 BIOTECanada, Biotechnology Industry Statement of Ethical Principles.  Available at 
http://www.biotech.ca/EN/ethics.html 
 
134 Alibeck K Handelman S. BIOHAZARD: The Chilling True Story of the Largest Covert Biological Weapons 
Program in the World New York: Random House; 1999.  
135 http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm 
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offering novel ways of manipulating basic life processes.  For instance, through 
deliberate or inadvertent means, genetic modification of microorganisms could create 
organisms that are more virulent, are antibiotic-resistant, or have greater stability in 
the environment.  Advances in gene therapy may allow modification of the immune 
response system of the target population to increase or decrease susceptibility to a 
pathogen or disrupt the functioning of normal host genes.  
 
Those that conduct, fund, administer, and regulate work in the biosciences and 
biomedicine have an ethical and social responsibility to honour international 
agreements that they will use their knowledge and skill for the advancement of 
human, animal, and plant welfare and will not conduct activities in support of the use 
of micro-organisms, toxins or other biological agents for hostile purpose.  In 
addition, as individuals, collectively as members of professions, and in discussions 
with other segments of society, these all have an obligation to actively deliberate what 
measures are necessary to minimize the risk that their work could be employed for 
hostile ends.   
 
Today and in the future, an effective response to the threats from biological weapons 
will come from concerted international action by those in governments, the medical 
and scientific communities, non-governmental and professional organizations, the 
biotechnology and pharmaceutical industries and others.  The history of life science 
research contains many instances – laboratory biosafety and vivisection to name but 
two – where standards have been developed and controls have been negotiated out of 
widespread social concern.    
 
This Code is intended to provoke reflection, dialogue, and action regarding the 
desirability of response measures.  The list of points included is not exhaustive.  An 
understanding of the threats posed from the hostile use of biological weapons from 
states, groups or individuals will evolve over time and thus so will the necessary 
responses.  The provisions included should not be regarded as separating the 
acceptable from the unacceptable in all practical situations.  This Code is not a 
simple algorithm that generates definitive answers about what needs to be done.  In 
some situations, standards may be in tension with each other or with standards from 
other sources.  Such situations require those engaged in the life sciences to consider 
for themselves and discuss with others what constitutes appropriate action.  The 
provisions of this Code should influence those associated with the life sciences to 
consider broadly who is affected by their work; to examine if they and their 
colleagues are acting with due regard; to consider how the public, if reasonably well 
informed, would view their actions; to analyze how the least empowered will be 
affected by their actions; and to consider whether their acts would be judged worthy 
of the ideal of those working in the life sciences.   
 
In keeping with this, those that work in the life sciences should: 
 
* acknowledge that minimizing risks from the hostile use of advances in the 
life sciences is of concern to them and part of their responsibility as 
professionals; 
* recognize their personal benign intent is an insufficient justification for 
setting aside such concerns; 
* strive to become aware of the ‘dual-use’ applications of their work; 
* consider the direct and indirect benefits and harms of their work to 
colleagues, their profession, their communities, and society at large; 
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* be aware of the work of associates; 
* ensure they are knowledgeable and comply with respective national and 
international regulations regarding the physical and biological containment 
of agents.  Where existing measure are considered to be inadequate such 
concerns should be raised with relevant policy officials and professional 
organizations; 
* take actions within their own sphere of influence that will contribute to 
risk reduction; 
* ensure that their actions are known amongst and complement the actions 
of others; 
* acknowledge they have a responsibility to consider the interests and ideas 
of all segments of society in assessing what needs to be done. 
 
Responsibility for minimizing the risk that life sciences will be used for hostile 
purposes is not just a matter for individuals, but one for the scientific and medical 
communities operating as a whole.  Collective activities should be undertaken to 
monitor the threat of biological weapons and to identify actions likely to prevent 
biological weapons proliferation.  As part of this, acting in concert, those 
representing and funding work in the biosciences and biomedicine should: 
 
* recognize that their expertise means they have a responsibility to 
contribute to efforts to reduce the risks associated with biological weapons;  
* set up procedures whereby those concerned about possible dual-use 
applications can seek guidance and report any concerns, including 
whistleblowing on suspicious activities; 
* educate their members and the public about the potential for and 
responses to biological weapons, including through increasing awareness 
of this Code;  
* establish the expectation that where there is disagreement about the 
implications of experiments and findings, then these should be debated 
openly; 
* institute measures to scrutinize all work with potentially dangerous 
consequences and to ensure it is submitted to rigorous and independent 
peer review; 
* put in place procedures to survey overall developments in life science 
research to identity emerging areas of concern; 
* call for funding to be further directed at the alleviating the causes of 
insecurity and poverty worldwide (e.g., the spread of infectious disease);    
* reinforce existing international commitments on States to achieve effective 
progress towards general and complete disarmament, including the 
prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass destruction; 
* recognize that international agreements are sometimes written in a 
comprehensive and abstract manner that can leave standards of 
appropriate conduct ill-defined.  Efforts should be made to actively engage 
governments to clarify the understanding and meaning of prohibitions; 
* call for States to pursue in good faith disarmament negotiations leading to 
strict and effective international control that reflect the multiple concerns in 
the international community. 
 
In undertaking these measures, individuals and collective bodies should further 
recognize that concerns about biological weapons are not limited to activities directly 
contributing to the development, production or stockpiling of agents as part of 
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manifestly offensive programmes.  For instance, the recurring interest in some 
quarters for so-called incapacitating agents threatens to undermine international 
efforts to prohibit the development, production, and retention of biological agents of 
types and in quantities that serve no prophylactic, protective or other peaceful 
purpose. In addition, however inadvertently, activities undertaken as part of 
biodefence programmes to elucidate the mechanism of virulence or assess biological 
threats can undermine international confidence in and in themselves violate 
prohibition regimes.  To prevent this, efforts should be made to strengthen the 
confidence between peoples and the general improvement of the international 
atmosphere.  The presumption should be that the details of biodefence programmes 
should be open for public scrutiny.   
 
71. This code is intended as a ‘modest’ contribution in a few important respects.  First, the 
proposing of such content is not intended to make the process of debating what any code 
should be superfluous.  Rather it is intended to serve as an example of what could be done in 
order to promote discussion.  The adoption of such a code should be viewed as an occasion 
for asking questions about the place of science in society at a given time, and how that might 
change.  A second related point is that the stipulations seek to evoke deliberation rather than 
provide definitive answers.  This approach is taken on the basis that, in these relatively early 
days of widespread concerted action to define and address the security risks stemming from 
work in the life sciences and elsewhere, the emphasis should be placed on provoking 
dialogue about what needs to be done rather than closing it down.  Such discussion should 
include assessments of the criteria by which codes are judged to be ‘useful’ or ‘ineffective’, 
noting that such criteria are themselves likely to change over time.  Certainly a further 
consideration of many of the terms and stipulations listed is needed. For instance, an 
understanding of ‘potentially dangerous consequences’ or just how research should be 
‘reviewed’.133 Some NGOs have already proposed a detailed elaboration of possible do’s and 
don’ts.  The purpose here is not to provide answers, but to raise issues as topics that need to 
be addressed in future discussions.  The working through of what particular terms entail 
could be treated as part of the process related benefits of any code.  Third, it is also pitched in 
a largely negative tone regarding their possible detrimental consequences rather than their 
role in reducing threats from biological weapons.  While this or other deficiencies may well 
need correcting, the rationale in proposing such a code has been to flag possible issues to be 
addressed rather than resolving its final content. 
 
72. In its terms, this code recognizes the importance and limitations of trying to establish 
rules specifying proper conduct.  Rather than setting out certain standards and expectations, it 
seeks to initiate a process of critical reflection and dialogue.  The provisions deliberately seek 
to challenge narrow focuses on biological and physical containment, the responsibilities of 
individuals, offensive programmes, or non-proliferation agendas.  The disarmament focus 
could link with initiatives other areas to reinforce efforts against nuclear, chemical and other 
proscribed weapons. 
 
                                                 
136 Models of this as provided by National Research Council. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism 
Committee on Research Standards and Practice to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology 
Washington, DC: National Academies Press; 2004 and Steinbruner J and Harris E. Controlling dangerous 
pathogens. Issues in Science and Technology 19, 3, Spring 2003. 
131133 Models of this are provided by National Research Council. Biotechnology Research in an Age of Terrorism Committee 
on Research Standards and Practice to Prevent the Destructive Application of Biotechnology Washington, DC: National 
Academies Press; 2004 Available at http://books.nap.edu/catalog/10827.html and Steinbruner J and Harris E. Controlling 
dangerous pathogens. Issues in Science and Technology 19, 3, Spring 2003. 
137 See, e.g., note 27. 
See, e.g., note 27. 
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Conclusions   
 
73. Overall, the previous subsection and the Briefing Paper as a whole have suggested how a 
‘matrix of codes’ might be taken forward and the possible aims and audiences involved.  
Table 1 provides a different appreciation of these issues by suggesting how the codes will 
function and who will be the main agents for taking the codes forward. 
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Table 1: A Proposed Matrix of Codes: Functions and Implementers  
Type of Code Primary Functions Principal Implementers 
Code of Ethics Establish an organizational 
basis for future action by 
initially affirming the 
prohibition against the 
development of biological 
weapons 
 
Policy makers in funding 
and professional 
organizations  
Code of Conduct Provide elaboration of 
individual and collective 
responsibilities of those 
associated life science work 
 
Set a basis for long term 
discussion about what needs 
to be done, in part by 
challenging existing agenda 
and framing of issues 
 
Life science professionals  
Code of Practice  Incorporate BW and 
biosecurity concerns within 
of day to day work 
procedures  
Administrators, regulators, 
funders, and practitioners 
associated with scientific 
and medical practice    
 
74. This section has provided the basic outline of a possible ‘matrix of codes’ that could take 
forward many of the analytical points made in previous section.  Ultimately though it should 
be stressed that whether a code (or even a matrix of them) will be more than a piece of paper 
in a  drawer depends on the practical commitments made by organizations in promoting and 
implementing them.  The long term interest in codes in the sciences and the relatively little 
progress that has been made to date should serve to caution against the idea that codes might 
prove a relatively straightforward policy option.  Likewise their utility should not be 
assumed. Rather, careful questions need to be addressed about their aims and audience; 
questions which themselves raise issues about consequences of work, the potential for ethical 
standards to affect behavior, the place of science in society, and the future of arms control. 
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Annex A: The proposed Code of Conduct was developed from ideas taken from the 
following sources.  
 
* “The resolution of bioethical issues requires broad public discourse. We acknowledge our 
responsibility to consider the interest and ideas of all segments of society.”  
  
-- Ethical Principles of BIOTECanada http://www.biotech.ca/EN/ethics.html  
 
* “Every major technology—metallurgy, explosives, internal combustion, aviation, 
electronics, nuclear energy—has been extensively exploited, not only for peaceful purposes, 
but also for hostile ones. Any major turn to the use of biotechnology for hostile purposes 
could have consequences qualitatively very different from those that have followed from the 
hostile exploitation of earlier technologies. Unlike … conventional or even nuclear weapons, 
biotechnology has the potential to place mass destructive capability in a multitude of hands.”  
 
-- Statement by Matthew Meselson http://www.hir.harvard.edu/articles/?id=919&page=4  
 
* “It is not intended that the individual parts of the Code be used in isolation to justify errors 
of omission or commission.  The list of Principles and Clauses is not exhaustive.  The Clauses 
should not be read as separating the acceptable from the unacceptable in professional 
conduct in all practical situations.  The Code is not a simple ethical algorithm that generates 
ethical decisions.  In some situations, standards may be in tension with each other or with 
standards from other sources.  These situations require the software engineer to use ethical 
judgment to act in a manner which is most consistent with the spirit of the Code of Ethics and 
Professional Practice, given the circumstances. 
 
Ethical tensions can best be addressed by thoughtful consideration of fundamental principles, 
rather than blind reliance on detailed regulations.  These Principles should influence 
software engineers to consider broadly who is affected by their work; to examine if they and 
their colleagues are treating other human beings with due respect; to consider how the 
public, if reasonably well informed, would view their decisions; to analyze how the least 
empowered will be affected by their decisions; and to consider whether their acts would be 
judged worthy of the ideal professional working as a software engineer.  In all these 
judgments concern for the health, safety and welfare of the public is primary; that is, the 
"Public Interest" is central to this Code. 
 
The dynamic and demanding context of software engineering requires a code that is 
adaptable and relevant to new situations as they occur.  However, even in this generality, the 
Code provides support for software engineers and managers of software engineers who need 
to take positive action in a specific case by documenting the ethical stance of the profession.  
The Code provides an ethical foundation to which individuals within teams and the team as a 
whole can appeal.  The Code helps to define those actions that are ethically improper to 
request of a software engineer or teams of software engineers.” 
 
-- SOFTWARE ENGINEERING CODE OF ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE  
IEEE-CS/ACM Joint Task Force on Software Engineering Ethics and Professional 
 
* “11. Rapid advances in microbiology, molecular biology, and genetic engineering have 
created extraordinary opportunities for biomedical research and hold great promise for 
improving human health and the quality of life. Better and more rapid diagnostic tools, novel 
vaccines, and therapeutic drugs can be foreseen. At the same time, there is concern about the 
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possible misuse of research for the development of more potent biological weapons and the 
spread of new infectious diseases. It may be difficult to distinguish legitimate biomedical 
research from research by unscrupulous scientists with the malign purpose of producing 
more effective biological weapons… 
 
16.  That the World Medical Association, National Medical Associations and healthcare 
workers worldwide promote, with the World Health Organization, the United Nations, and 
other appropriate entities, the establishment of an international consortium of medical and 
public health leaders to monitor the threat of biological weapons, to identify actions likely to 
prevent biological weapons proliferation, and to develop a coordinated plan for monitoring 
the worldwide emergence of infectious diseases. This plan should address: (a) international 
monitoring and reporting systems so as to enhance the surveillance and control of infectious 
disease outbreaks throughout the world; (b) the development of an effective verification 
protocol under the UN Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention; (c) education of 
physicians and public health workers about emerging infectious diseases and potential 
biological weapons; (d) laboratory capacity to identify biological pathogens; (e) availability 
of appropriate vaccines and pharmaceuticals; and (f) financial, technical, and research 
needs to reduce the risk of use of biological weapons and other major infectious disease 
threats.” 
 
-- 2002 The WMA Declaration of Washington (http://www.wma.net/e/policy/b1.htm) 
 
* “The States Parties to this Convention, 
 
Determined to act with a view to achieving effective progress towards general and complete 
disarmament, including the prohibition and elimination of all types of weapons of mass 
destruction, and convinced that the prohibition of the development, production and 
stockpiling of chemical and bacteriological(biological) weapons and their elimination, 
through effective measures, will facilitate the achievement of general and complete 
disarmament under strict and effective international control,  
 
Recognizing the important significance of the Protocol for the Prohibition of the Use in War 
of Asphyxiating, Poisonous or Other Gases, and of Bacteriological Methods of Warfare, 
signed at Geneva on June 17, 1925, and conscious also of the contribution which the said 
Protocol has already made, and continues to make, to mitigating the horrors of war,  
 
Reaffirming their adherence to the principles and objectives of that Protocol and calling 
upon all States to comply strictly with them,  
 
Recalling that the General Assembly of the United Nations has repeatedly condemned all 
actions contrary to the principles and objectives of the Geneva Protocol of June 17, 1925,  
 
Desiring to contribute to the strengthening of confidence between peoples and the general 
improvement of the international atmosphere,  
 
Desiring also to contribute to the realization of the purposes and principles of the United 
Nations,  
 
Convinced of the importance and urgency of eliminating from the arsenals of States, through 
effective measures, such dangerous weapons of mass destruction as those using chemical or 
bacteriological (biological) agents,  
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Recognizing that an agreement on the prohibition of bacteriological (biological)and toxin 
weapons represents a first possible step towards the achievement of agreement on effective 
measures also for the prohibition of the development, production and stockpiling of chemical 
weapons, and determined to continue negotiations to that end, 
 
Determined for the sake of all mankind, to exclude completely the possibility of 
bacteriological (biological) agents and toxins being used as weapons,  
 
Convinced that such use would be repugnant to the conscience of mankind and that no effort 
should be spared to minimize this risk, 
 
Have agreed as follows:” 
 
-- Preamble to the Convention on the Prohibition of the Development, Production and 
Stockpiling of Bacteriological (Biological) and Toxin Weapons and on Their Destruction. 
Available at http://www.opbw.org  
* “The ICRC’s message to actors in the life sciences can be summarized as follows: 
• Be aware of the risks, rules and responsibilities as outlined in the ICRC appeal. 
• Take action in your own domain to minimize the risk. 
• Be aware of the work and interests of others and work with them. 
Some examples of the types of practical action the ICRC proposes to actors in the life science 
through the 'Biotechnology, Weapons and Humanity' appeal include: 
• Scrutinizing all research with potentially dangerous consequences and ensuring it 
is submitted to rigorous and independent peer review. 
• Adoption of professional and industrial codes of conduct aimed at preventing the 
abuse of biological agents. 
• Ensuring effective regulation of research programmes, facilities and biological 
agents that may lend themselves to misuse, and supervising individuals with access 
to sensitive technologies. 
• Supporting enhanced national and international programmes to prevent and 
respond to the spread of infectious disease. 
• Ensuring that awareness of risks, rules and responsibilities to prevent poison and 
the deliberate spread of disease are part of laboratory or other training for all 
personnel.” 
-- ICRC Responsibilities of Actors in the Life Sciences to Prevent Hostile Use 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/html/5VDJLW?OpenDocument 
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